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SUPREME COURT RAMIFICATIONS
COMPLICATING THE COPYRIGHT
LAW'S "WORK MADE FOR HIRE
PROVISIONS": COMMUNITY FOR
CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE v. REID
Congress' power to enact copyright legislation is derived from
the copyright clause of the United States Constitution.' The copy-
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The copyright clause provides that "[tihe Congress shall
have Power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries .... " Id. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464
U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (Constitution gives Congress task of defining scope of copyright laws);
Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) ("copyright is the creature of the Fed-
eral Statute passed in the exercise of the power vested in the Congress."); A. LATMAN, THE
COPYRIGHT LAW 16 (6th ed. 1986) ("constitutional provision upon which all U.S. copyright
acts were founded"); 1 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.02, at 1-30 (26th ed. 1989)
(federal power to enact copyright and patent legislation comes from clause). See generally
Fred Fisher Music Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643, 647-56 (1943) (brief history of
copyright law prior to 1909 Act); Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: 1, 45 COLUM. L.
REv. 503-29 (1945) (discussion of copyright law suggesting revision of 1909 Act); Fenning,
The Origin of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEo. L.J. 109, 109-17
(1928) (historical account of copyright clause).
The copyright clause's primary purpose is to secure the "general benefits derived by the
public from the labors of authors." Fox Film Corp., 286 U.S. at 127. See Twentieth Century
Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975). Justice Stewart, writing for the Court,
enumerated the purpose of copyright as a balance of competing claims upon the public
interest:
Creative work is to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ulti-
mately serve the cause of promoting broad public availability of literature, music,
and the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair
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right clause establishes the general principle that only an author
should be afforded copyright protection.' In 1903, the United
return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good. (citations omitted).
Id. (emphasis added). See also Sony Corp. of America, 464 U.S. at 477 (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing) (monopoly created by copyright rewards author in order to benefit the public (citing
Twentieth Century Music Corp., 422 U.S. at 156 (1975)); Fox Film Corp. 286 U.S. at 127-28
(1932)); Red Baron - Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., No. 88-0156-A (E.D. Va. July 18,
1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file) (limited grant of exclusive right to authors is
means by which public purpose is achieved); H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 7
(1909). In the Report accompanying the 1909 Copyright Act revision, the Judiciary Com-
mittee of the House of Representatives explained that Congress' enactment of copyright
laws under the copyright clause of the Constitution is founded "upon the ground that the
welfare of the public will be served .... " Id. See also THE FEDERALIST No. 43, at 309 (J.
Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961). Although the debates on the copyright clause at the Consti-
tutional Convention were limited, the clause's main purpose was described by James
Madison when he wrote: "The copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged . . . to be
a right of common law .... Id. The public good fully coincides . . . with the claims of
individuals." Id.
The protection of federal copyright legislation extends only to works that qualify as
"writings" pursuant to the copyright clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("to their
respective Writings"); 1 M. NIMMER, supra at'§ 1.08 [A], at 1-44 (only "writings" may claim
protection of copyright laws). See generally Note, Copyright - Study of the Term "Writings" in
the Copyright Clause of the Constitution, 31 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1263 passim (1956) (discussion of
term "writings" within meaning of copyright clause). The word "writings" has been liber-
ally construed by the courts. See Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 561 (1973) ("writ-
ings" construed to reflect broad arena of constitutional principles); The Trademark Cases,
100 U.S. 82, 94 (1879) ("writings" construed as "the fruits of intellectual labor embodied
in the form of books, prints, engravings and the like"); Reiss v. National Quotation Bu-
reau, 276 F. 717, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (Judge Learned Hand noted Congress' power in-
cludes the "ingenuity [that] men should devise" in the future).
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("securing for limited Times to Authors. ); I M.
NIMMER, supra note 1, § 1.06 [A], at 1-37 (under copyright clause, only "authors" entitled
to copyright protection). Courts construing the term "author" have deemed originality to
be the determinative factor in deciding whether the author's work is afforded copyright
protection. See Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 561 ("author," within constitutional sense, construed
to mean "originator"); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)
("he to whom anything owes its origin"); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191
F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (copyrighted work owes its origin to author); A. LATMAN, supra
note 1, at 17 (author is "one who [independently] creates a work without copying"). Gener-
ally, only a trace of originality is needed. See Weissman v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313, 1321
(2d Cir. 1989) (only "unmistakable dash of originality" need be shown); Gaste v. Kaiser-
man, 863 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1988) (originality requirement is minimal); A. LATMAN,
supra note 1, at 23 (minimal amount of creative effort is required). Derivative works, how-
ever, must have substantialoriginality. See Sherry Mfg. Co. v. Towel King of Fla., Inc., 753
F.2d 1565, 1568 (1 1th Cir. 1985) ("derivative work must contain some substantial, and not
merely trivial originality"); Eden Toys v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27, 34 (2d
Cir. 1982) ("standard for sufficient originality [in derivative works] is whether work con-
tains 'some substantial, not merely trivial, originality.' " (quoting L. Batlin & Sons, Inc. v.
Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 857 (1976))); Donald v. Zack
Meyer's T.V. Sales & Serv., 426 F.2d 1027, 1030 (5th Cir. 1970), (same), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 992 (1971).
CCNV v. Reid
States Supreme Court implicitly recognized an exception to the
general rule that if a work is made for hire, the creator's em-
ployer is deemed the author and is thereby entitled to copyright
protection.'
The Copyright Act of 1909 codified this exception as the
"works made for hire" doctrine." The legislative history of the
works made for hire provisions in the 1909 Act indicates an intent
to distinguish between the doctrine's treatment of employees and
independent contractors. 5 Nevertheless, courts construing these
provisions extended the earlier common law rule which presumed
I Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 248 (1903). Although owner-
ship of copyrights was not a major issue in Bleistein, the case is deemed to be the origin of
the "work for hire" doctrine. Id. Referring to the ownership of circus advertisement de-
signs the Court stated: "[t]here was evidence warranting the inference that the designs
belonged to the plaintiffs, they having been produced by persons employed and paid by the
plaintiffs." Id. See Murray v. Gelderman, 566 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1978) ("work for
hire" doctrine was first recognized by Supreme Court in Bleistein); Brattleboro Publishing
Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565, 567 (1966) ("so-called 'works for hire'
doctrine recognized" in Bleistein); Simon, Faculty Writings: Are They "Works Made for Hire"
Under the 1976 Copyright Act?, 9 J.C. & U.L. 485, 487 (1982-83) (cases and commentators
agree that Bleistein is origin of "work for hire" doctrine); Comment, The Works Made for
Hire Doctrine Under the Copyright Act of 1976 - A Misinterpretation: Aldon Accessories Ltd. v.
Spiegel, Inc., 20 U.S.F. L. REV. 649, 649 (1986) (Bleistein is seminal case on "work for hire"
doctrine).
Today, the "works made for hire" doctrine is codified in the Copyright Act of 1976.
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-
810 (1982)). The Act provides in part: "In the case of a work made for hire, the employer
or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title .... " Id. at § 201(b). Categorizing a work as "made for hire" is important not
only because it determines the initial ownership of the copyright but also the copyright
duration, the owner's renewal rights, and the owner's termination rights. See Community
for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2171 (1989); 1 M. NIMMER, supra note
1, at § 5.03[A].
' Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 349, Ch. 320, § 62, 35 Stat. 1088 (1909). The
"work made for hire" doctrine in the 1909 Act stated "the word 'author' shall include an
employer in the case of works made for hire." Id. The 1909 Act also codified the general
rule regarding "authors" and "writings": "the works for which copyright may be secured
under this title shall include all the writings of an author." Id. at § 4, 35 Stat. 1079.
' See Stenographic Report of the Proceedings of the Librarians' Conf. on Copyright, 2d Sess. 188
(Nov. 1-4, 1905), reprinted in 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT at 188 (E.
Brylawski & A. Goldman ed. 1976). During the hearings for the 1909 Act a distinction
between independent contractors and employees was recognized. Id. Mr. Smith, Secretary
of the Reproductive Arts Copyright League, noted that "the right belonging to [an em-
ployed artist] ... should be very different from the right held by the independent artist...
." Id. See Note, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act:
Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1284-85 (1987) (legislative history of
1909 Act indicates legislators distinguished between employees and independent
contractors).
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employer ownership in the copyrights of commissioned works.'
These decisions applied the works made for hire doctrine equally
to employers and independent contractors.'
The Copyright Act of 19768 completely revised the 1909 Act.'
6 See Yardley v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 108 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1939) (at common law,
copyright of commissioned work presumptively passes to patron), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 686
(1940); Dielman v. White, 102 F. 892, 894-95 (C.C.D. Mass. 1900) (strong implication that
copyright belongs to patron if she commissions artist to prepare work). Cf. Lumiere v. Rob-
ertson-Cole Distrib. Corp., 280 F. 550, 552-53 (2d Cir.) (copyright of photograph rests
with sitter, not commissioned photographer), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 583 (1922); Lumiere v.
Pathe Exchange, Inc., 275 F. 428, 428 (2d Cir. 1921) (photographer's employer entitled to
copyright).
See Brattleboro Publishing Co. v. Winmill Publishing Corp., 369 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.
1966). Brattleboro is the seminal case revealing the equal treatment of independent contrac-
tors and employees. The court noted that the "works for hire" doctrine "is applicable
whenever an employee's work is produced at the instance and expense of his employer."
Id. at 567. The court continued: "We see no sound reason why these same principles are
not applicable when the parties bear the relationship of employer and independent con-
tractor." Id. at 568. See Comment, supra note 3, at 649-50 (under 1909 Act doctrine ap-
plied equally to employees and independent contractors). See, e.g., Lin-Brook Builders
Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298, 300 (9th Cir. 1965) (when employer engages another,
regardless of her status as independent contractor or employee, presumption is that copy-
right title rests in employer); Grant v. Kellogg, Co., 58 F. Supp. 48, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1944)
(independent commercial artist who created Rice Krispies gnomes surrendered copyright
by virtue of employment with Kellogg).
I Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§
101-810 (1982). The pertinent "work for hire" provisions of the 1976 Act are § 101(1)
and (2), which defines a "work made for hire" and § 201(b) regarding ownership of copy-
right. Section 101 provides in part:
A "work made for hire" is -
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment; or
(2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective
work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a
supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument
signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire ....
Id. at §101 (1) and (2) (emphasis added). Section 201(b) provides:
WORKS MADE FOR HIRE. - In the case of a work made for hire, the employer
or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for pur-
poses of this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a writ-
ten instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright.
Id. at § 201(b).
' See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1096-97 (9th Cir. 1989) (Congress did not
want to continue the 1909 Act). The Dumas court further noted that "the 1976 Act was a
'radical departure' from prior law." Id. at 1102 (quoting Ms. Barbara Ringer, former Reg-
ister of Copyrights); Ringer, First Thoughts on the Copyright Act of 1976, 13 COPYRIGHT 187,
188 (1977) ("bill that ... became . . . Act of 1976 . . . not based on pre-existing legisla-
tion"). See also Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1097 n.6 (provides exhaustive list of commentators who
unanimously agree that 1976 Act is clear break from prior doctrine). But see O'Meara,
'Works Made for Hire' under the Copyright Act of 1976 - Two Interpretations, 15 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 523 (1982) (legislative history is ambiguous).
CCNV v. Reid
The 1976 Act's new work for hire provisions"0 are the manifesta-
tion of a heavily negotiated compromise between the creators of
works and the parties that hire them regarding the treatment of
commissioned works prepared by independent contractors. 1 The
creators advocated the exclusion of commissioned works from the
definition of work for hire 2 and alternatively, because of their
weak bargaining position,'3 opposed any broad definition that
would transform a commissioned work into a work for hire upon
10 See supra note 8 (enumerates new work for hire provisions of 1976 Act).
" See Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1098 ("compromise" of new definitions are product of "hard-
fought negotiations"). Both the Senate and House Reports on the final bill noted: "The
definition now provided by the bill represents a compromise which ...spells out those
specific categories of commissioned works that can be considered 'works made for hire...
." S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. AND ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737. See also Litman,
Copyright, Compromise and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 859 (1987) (1976 Act
is "detailed comprehensive code .. . full of specific, heavily negotiated compromise");
Note, supra note 5, at 1292 ("a compromise had been reached"). At first, the compromise
consisted of four specific categories of commissioned works which could be works made for
hire if the parties agreed in writing. See REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.,
Supplementary Report on Copyright Law Revision pt. 6, at 67-68 (Comm. Print 1965). From
the Report it was clear that "other works made on ... commission would not come within
the definition .. .of a work made for hire." Id. In 1967, another compromise added an
additional four categories to the list. See H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 86, 87
(1967). The final list of enumerated categories of commissioned works which could be
works for hire if the parties agreed in writing is codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1982). See
supra note 8 (quotes text of 17 U.S.C § 101(2)).
11 Cf H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
AND ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5737 (creators proposed that hiring party could use the work to
extent it was needed for his regular business, but all other rights vested in creator); Note,
supra note 5, at 1291. The complete exclusion of commissioned works was met with
"strong opposition on the part of book publishers ..... Id.
13 See Definition of Work Made for Hire in the Copyright Act of 1976: Hearing on S. 2044
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter Hearing on S.
2044]. Due to unequal bargaining power of parties, authors had two choices: submit work
as work made for hire or do not submit it. Id. at 132-33 (statement of illustrator, Mr.
Robert G. Steele); Note, supra note 5, at 1308-09 (citing Hearing on S. 2044); Note, Blanket
Licensing: A Proposal for the Protection and Encouragement of Artistic Endeavor, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 1245, 1254 n.57 (1983) ("An artist's total dependence on the publisher to reach the
public explains [leverage publisher has over artist]."). See also Hearing on S. 2044, supra, at
34 (fact that big stars can negotiate any contract they want is "irrelevant to problems faced
by professionals at all levels") (statement of Ms. Robin Brickman, member of Graphic Art-
ist's Guild); Id. at 73 (highest paid composer in his field stated if he chose not to enter into
work made for hire arrangement, he would have to consider some other field of work)
(statement of Mr. Elmer Bernstein, for Screen Composers of America). But see id. at 59
(Magazine Publishers Association argued that magazine writers "exercise bargaining power
on an equal level .. .and demand and receive their quid pro quo") (statement of Mr. E.
Gabriel Perle, for Magazine Publishers Association).
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the creator's written consent." The publishers, on the other
hand, opposed any exclusion of commissioned works from the
work for hire definition in an effort to retain as many copyrights
as possible." Unlike the 1909 Act's provision for works made for
hire, 6 section 101 makes a sharp distinction between works "pre-
pared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment"
and works prepared by an independent contractor. 7 Under the
1976 Act, a commissioned work prepared by an independent con-
tractor must meet two criteria to be deemed a work made for
hire.' It must fall within one of nine enumerated categories, 9
and the parties must agree in writing that the work shall be con-
sidered a work made for hire.20
Despite the apparent distinction between employees and inde-
pendent contractors in section 101's definition of work made for
hire,' Congress' failure to define the term "employee" has
caused many hiring parties to assert copyright ownership pursuant
to subdivision one even when dealing with independent contrac-
tors.2 Consequently, the circuit courts have split in their interpre-
" H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1967). See Note, supra note 5, at 1292.
" See H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 86 (1967) (opponents of commissioned
work exclusion argued that "distinction between employment and commission is ... mean-
ingless"); Angel & Tannenbaum, Works Made for Hire Under S. 22, 22 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
209, 230-32 (1976) (strong opposition to exclusion of commissioned works expressed by
publishers).
s See supra note 4 (quotes "works made for hire" provisions of 1909 Act).
'7 17 U.S.C. § 101. Subdivision one applies specifically to works prepared by "em-
ployee[s]" and subdivision two applies specifically to "specially ordered or commissioned"
works. Id.
"' See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1), (2) (1982); supra note 8 and infra note 20 and accompanying
text (text of § 101 (1) and (2)).
" See 17 U.S.C. § 101(2) (1982). The nine categories are: a contribution to a collective
work, a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, a translation, a supplementary
work, a compilation, an instructional text, a test, answer material for a test, and an atlas.
Id. The first category of "a contribution to a collective work" includes contributions to
such works as newspapers and magazines, therefore § 101(2) affects a substantial number of
authors and artists. See generally 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, §3.02, at 3-5 to 3-8 (nature of
collective works).
" See 17 U.S.C. § 10 1(2) (1982) ("if... parties . . . agree in a written instrument signed
by them ....."); May v. Morganelli-Heumann and Assoc., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 n.4 (9th
Cir. 1980) (independent contractor not subject to works for hire doctrine because absence
of written agreement and drawings did not fall within any enumerated category); Meltzer
v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 854-55 (D.N.J. 1981) (same).
*1 See supra note 8.
22 See, e.g., Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 1989) (purchaser
of lithographs from independent contractor's employer asserts copyright ownership be-
CCNV v. Reid
tation of "employee" in section 101 of the Copyright Act.2" Re-
cently, however, the United States Supreme Court purported to
resolve this conflict in Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid.24
I. COMMUNITY FOR CREATIVE NON-VIOLENCE V. REID
The plaintiff, Community for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV),
is a charitable organization dedicated to eliminating homelessness
in America. 5 During the fall of 1985, CCNV decided to sponsor a
display for the December Pageant of Peace in Washington, D.C.26
CCNV conceived the general idea of the display, a sculpture enti-
tled "Third World America," which depicted a "modern" Nativ-
ity scene of a homeless black couple and their newborn, reclining
on a steam grate. 7
Resporident, James Earl Reid, a sculptor, orally agreed to sculpt
the three figures2" while CCNV took on the task of creating the
steam grate and pedestal.29 On Christmas Eve, Reid completed
cause purchased from employer); Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children and Adults of
La., v. Playboy Enters., 815 F.2d. 323, 324-25 (5th Cir. 1987) (Easter Seals asserted copy-
right against purchaser of film made by independent contractor working for Easter Seals),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988), [hereinafter Easter Seal]; Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago
Sys. Softw., 793 F.2d 889, 891-92 (7th Cir.) (employer of independent contracting com-
puter program sought copyright damages when programmer marketed same program),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986); Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548,
549-51 (2d Cir.) (employer of independent contractor asserted copyright against party who
purchased design from independent contractor), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984).
28 See infra notes 47-51 and accompanying text (discussing four interpretations of "em-
ployee" within meaning of § 101(1) of "works made for hire" provisions).
2 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989).
2 Id. at 2169. Mitchell D. Snyder "a member and trustee of CCNV," was also a plaintiff.
Id.
11 Id. Ultimately, the sculpture was rejected by the Pageant because of its political under-
tones. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1455 n.6
(D.D.C. 1987). The sculpture was, however, displayed nearby. Id.
" See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2169 (1989)
[hereinafter CCNV v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989)] (quoting CCNV v. Reid, 652 F. Supp.
1453, 1454 (D.D.C. 1987)). On the pedestal of the sculpture was written "and still there is
no room at the inn." Id.
8 Id. Reid also agreed to sculpt a shopping cart containing the figures' belongings.
CCNV v. Reid, 846 F.2d. 1485, 1487 (D.C. Cir. 1988). "Reid decided to donate his ser-
vices to this 'worthy cause.' " Brief for Respondent at 1, CCNV v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166
(1989) (No. 88-293) [hereinafter Brief for Respondent] (quoting transcript of trial before
the district court, February 2, 1987, at 146, Reid testifying).
29 CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2169. CCNV assumed all expenses incurred in the production of
the work, which totaled $15,000. Id.; Brief for Respondent, supra note 28, at 1 ("Snyder
agreed to reimburse Reid's expenses," ultimately paying him total of $15,000).
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the sculpture and delivered it to Washington, D.C." After a one
month display, the sculpture was returned to him for some minor
repairs.31 It was during this time that Reid learned CCNV was
planning to take the sculpture on a tour of several cities. 2 When
CCNV requested the return of "Third World America," Reid re-
fused, contending that the sculpture was too fragile to withstand
such a rigorous tour.8" Subsequently, Reid filed a certificate of
copyright registration for the sculpture in his name. 4 Immedi-
ately thereafter, CCNV filed their own competing certificate of
copyright registration. 3
5
CCNV brought suit against Reid seeking the return of "Third
World America" and a determination of copyright ownership. 6
The district court held that the sculpture was a work made for
hire under section 101 of the Copyright Act and that CCNV was
the exclusive owner of the copyright in the sculpture." The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed and re-
manded the case. 8 Adopting the "literal interpretation" of the
Fifth Circuit, the court held that the sculpture was not a "work
made for hire" under section 101 of the Copyright Act because
SO CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2170. It was previously agreed that the sculpture would be deliv-
ered on December 12. Id.
31 Id.
" Id. The purpose of the tour was to raise money for the homeless. Id.
33 Id. at 2170. The three figures were made of a synthetic material known as "Design
Cast 62" which could be tinted to look like bronze. Id. at 2169-70. Reid objected to the
tour because he felt that the Design Cast 62 was "not strong enough to withstand the
ambitious itinerary." Id. at 2170. Instead, Reid wanted the sculpture to be cast in bronze at
a cost of $35,000 or, in the alternative, to have a master mold made at a cost of $5,000. Id.
But, CCNV refused to spend more money on the project. Id.
", CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2170. Reid also had placed beneath the title of the sculpture his
own copyright notice: "© James Earl Reid, Sculptor '85." CCNV v. Reid, 846 F.2d. 1485,
1488 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
a CCVv, 109 S. Ct. at 2170.
I ld. Ronald Purtee, Reid's photographer, was also a party to the action. But he never
appeared before the court, nor did he claim any interest in the sculpture. Id. at 2170 n.l.
" Id. at 2170. Prior to the district court's decision in favor of CCNV, the court granted
CCNV's motion for preliminary injunction, ordering Reid to return the sculpture. Id. The
district court reasoned that Reid was CCNV's employee because CCNV was the motivating
force in the production of the sculpture, and since CCNV "directed enough of [Reid's]
effort to assure that, in the end, he had produced what they, not he, wanted ..... CCNV
v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453, 1456 (D.D.C. 1987). It is important to note that petitioners did
not assert that the sculpture satisfies the terms of § 101(2) and therefore the dispositive
inquiry in this case concerns the meaning of § 101(1). CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2171-72.
" Id. at 2170. See infra note 49 (discussion of Fifth Circuit's "literal interpretation" in
Easter Seals case).
CCNV v. Reid
Reid was an independent contractor under agency law.8 9 Further,
the sculpture did not fall within one of the nine categories of
work enumerated in the statute, nor did the parties agree in writ-
ing that the sculpture would be a work made for hire.40 Neverthe-
less, the court did suggest that the sculpture might be a joint work
under the Copyright Act and remanded the case for determina-
tion of this issue.4' The United States Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari42 to resolve the conflict among the circuits as to the proper
construction of the work made for hire provisions of the Copy-
right Act.4 In a unanimous decision, the Court affirmed the trial
court's judgment.4'
Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall focused his inquiry on
the proper construction of section 101(1);'I specifically, "whether
'Third World America' is 'a work prepared by an employee within
the scope of his or her employment.' ,,4' The Court began its in-
quiry with a discussion of the four interpretations that have
emerged among the circuits: 1) an "employee" prepares a work
whenever the hiring party retains the right to control the prod-
uct,48 2) an "employee" prepares a work whenever a hiring party
39 Id.
40 CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2170. The court of appeals construed Section 101 as creating " 'a
simple dichotomy in fact between employees and independent contractors.' " Id. (quoting
CCNV v. Reid, 846 F.2d 1485, 1492 (1988)).
41 Id. The issue of whether "Third World America" is a joint work will not be discussed
in this Comment. "A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982) (defining "joint work"). "The authors of a joint
work are co-owners of copyright in the work." Id. at § 201(a).
42 109 S. Ct. 362 (1988).
43 CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2170-71. Compare Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1102
(9th Cir. 1989) (only "formal, salaried" workers are employees under § 101(l)) with Easter
Seal, supra note 22, at 334-35 (common law agency principles determine who is employee
under § 101(1)) and Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548, 552 (2d Cir.),
(actual control of hired party determines whether she is "employee" under § 101(1)), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984) and Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 829 (D.
Colo. 1985) (right to control hired party establishes an "employee" under § 101(1)).
11 CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2180.
I1 ld. at 2171-72 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101(1)).
46 Id.
'7 See Id. at 2172. The Court noted that the conflict in the circuits has arisen due to the
legislature's failure to define a "work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or
her employment." Id.
48 Id. See Peregrine v. Lauren Corp., 601 F. Supp. 828, 828 (D. Colo. 1985). In Pere-
grine, a photographer sought to compel an advertising agency to pay for his services by
obtaining copyrights to the photographs he had taken for defendant. Id. at 828. Defend-
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actually wields control with respect to the creation of a particular
work,49 3) an "employee" within section 101(1) refers only to
"formal, salaried" employees, 50 and 4) an "employee" within sec-
ant's motion for summary judgment was granted, however, because it was able to rebut the
prima facie validity of the copyright. Id. at 829. The court reasoned that the "work for
hire relationship exists when an employer has the right to control the party doing the work
..... " Id. (emphasis added). See also Brunswick Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing
Co., 810 F.2d 410, 415 (4th Cir. 1987) (Hall, J., dissenting) ("Regardless of whether [em-
ployer's] control is ever exercised . . . only rational conclusion is that Congress, under the
1976 Act intended for the [work] produced by employee to be a work made for hire.");
Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566 F. Supp. 137, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("employment rela-
tionship rests... on right to control and not the exercise of that right") (emphasis added); 1 M.
NIMMER, supra note 1, § 5.03[B][1][a], at 5-13 (crucial question in determining employment
relationship is whether employer has right to control employee).
4 CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2172. See Aldon Accessories Ltd. v. Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548,
552 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984). Looking to the legislative history of the
1976 Act, the Aldon court noted that the common law presumption that a patron owned
the copyright of the independent contractor's work product created an injustice in cases
where the independent contractor did everything and the hiring party did nothing. Id.
(citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 5737). Relying on legislative silence, however, the court wrote: "there is no
indication . . . that Congress was focusing on contractors who actually supervised and di-
rected .... ." Aldon, 738 F.2d at 552 (emphasis added). The court held that in actual
control situations, the common law presumption was not changed. Id; The Aldon interpre-
tation was subsequently adopted by two circuits. CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2172. See Brunswick
Beacon, Inc. v. Schock-Hopchas Publishing Co., 810 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing
Aldon as applying to circumstances when temporary situations exist where "an employee of
one may be regarded as an employee of another."); Evans Newton, Inc. v. Chicago Sys.
Softw., 793 F.2d 889, 894 (7th Cir.) (court found Second Circuit's actual control analysis
"compelling"), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 949 (1986).
The overwhelming position taken by commentators is that Aldon is an aberration which
should not have been followed. See LITMAN, supra note 11, at 900 (Aldon "cleav[ed] to
earlier doctrine, and mangl[ed] the statutory language, . . . the court's interpretation
strains the statutory language," and renders writing requirement in § 101(2) meaningless);
Note, The Creative Commissioner: Commissioned Works Under the Copyright Act of 1976, 62
N.Y.U. L. REV. 373, 389 (1987) (Aldon "misapplied literal terms of the 1976 Act"); Com-
ment, supra note 3, at 661 (Aldon misinterpreted 1909 Act's case law and 1976 Act's legis-
lative history). See generally Brief for Respondent supra note 28, at 17-19 (provides three
page list of commentators who disagree with Aldon). Peregrine, which is an extension of
Aldon, has been equally criticized. See Comment, The "Work Made for Hire" Definition in the
1976 Copyright Act-A Simple Dichotomy: Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults
of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises, 26 Hous. L. REV. 361, 376-77 (1989) (Peregrine
underscores dangers of Aldon because it extended Aldon from "actual control" to mere
"right to control").
" CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2172. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1102 (9th Cir.
1989). The Dumas court relied largely on the legislative history of the 1976 Act to come to
its determination. See id. at 1098-1101 ("to fully understand the meaning of 'employee' as
used in the Act, we must turn to its legislative history."). Cf LITMAN, supra note 11, at 901
(those involved in legislative history understood "employee" to mean employee in salaried
job). See also infra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history and com-
mentators in support of Dumas interpretation). But see Gallery House, Inc. v. Yi, 582 F.
Supp. 1294, 1297 (N.D. I1. 1984) (one may be employee even when unpaid); 1 M. NIMMER,
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tion 101(1) carries its agency meaning.5' The first two interpreta-
tions could not be reconciled with the statutory language and
were therefore rejected.5 2 The Court relegated its dismissal of the
third interpretation to a footnote, reasoning that a "formal, sala-
ried" construction is not supported by the statutory language.58
Ultimately, the Court adopted the agency view endorsed by the
Fifth Circuit in Easter Seal Society for Crippled Children and Adults
of Louisiana, Inc. v. Playboy Enterprises.4 Using this approach, Jus-
tice Marshall concluded that Reid was an independent contractor
and therefore, "Third World America" was not a "work made for
supra note 1, § 5.03[B][1][a), at 5-12 ("unimportant whether .. .employee is a regular or
formal employee").
51 CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2172. See Easter Seal, supra note 22, at 334-35. In Easter Seal, the
court adopted a "literal interpretation" which "read[s] § 101 as a reflection of a simple
dichotomy in fact between employees and independent contractors." Id. at 329. The first
step under the Easter Seal test is to determine whether the hired party was an employee or
independent contractor using agency law principles. Id. If the hired party was an employee
then § 101(1) applies and if she was an independent contractor then § 101(2) applies. Id.
The court adopted the agency law approach because " 'scope of employment' is virtually a
term of art in agency law." Id. at 335. The court used the Restatement of Agency as a
guide. Id. at 335-36. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 220(2) (1958). The
nonexclusive list of factors in § 220(2) of the Restatement are helpful in a court's determi-
nation of an employment relationship:
(a) the extent of control which, by agreement, the master may exercise over the
details of the work;
(b) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;
(c) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without
supervision;
(d) the skill required in the particular occupation;
(e) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and
the place of work;
(f) the length of time for which the person is employed;
(g) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;
(h) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the employer;
(i) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and
servant; and
(j) whether the principal is or is not in business.
Id.
52 See CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2173 (neither actual control nor right to control tests are
"consistent with the text of the act"). Both tests ignore the dichotomy between § 101(1)
and (2) by allowing an independent contractor who is either subject to the hiring party's
right to control or who is actually controlled to fall within § 101(1)'s employment relation-
ship. See id.
51 CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2174 n.8. The Court, nevertheless, did admit that there was
support for this interpretation in the legislative history. Id. See infra note 61 and accompa-
nying text (discussing legislative history in support of formal, salaried interpretation).
4 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 981 (1988). See supra note 49
(discussing agency approach adopted by Fifth Circuit and Supreme Court).
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hire" within the meaning of section 101(1). 6"
In view of the legislative history 56 and statutory language
7 of
the Copyright Act of 1976, the Supreme Court had two alterna-
tives in CCNV.5 ' The Court could have either adopted the Easter
Seal agency approach, as it did," or the "formal, salaried" em-
ployee approach advanced by the Ninth Circuit in Dumas v. Gom-
merman.6" This Comment will assert that the Dumas interpretation
warranted more than a cursory dismissal. It will then analyze the
problems inherent in the CCNV Court's application of the Easter
Seal interpretation, including its failure to address the issue of ret-
roactivity. Finally, it will suggest a statutory modification to the
Copyright Act, codifying a nonretroactive Dumas interpretation of
"employee" as an alternative to the Supreme Court's Easter Seal
approach.
II. REJECTION OF Dumas APPROACH
Although the CCNV Court conceded that the "formal, salaried"
employee construction of section 101(1) can be supported by the
55 CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2179-80. The Court applied a multifactor non-exclusive balancing
test, utilizing the RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY. See id. at 2178-79. See, e.g., id. at 2178-79 nn.18-
31 (examples of courts that apply agency factors).
"' See supra notes 8-20 and accompanying text (discussing compromise in legislative his-
tory that lead to different treatments of employees and independent contractors).
" See supra note 49 and accompanying text (commentators criticizing Aldon and Pere-
grine decisions' distortion of statutory language); note 52 and accompanying text (actual
control and right to control tests cannot be squared with language of statute).
" See supra notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text (discussing formal, salaried and
agency law tests, respectively).
" See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
o 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989). See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discusses
formal, salaried view). The "formal, salaried" approach was endorsed by the Respondent:
the Ninth Circuit's "formal salaried" interpretation "most properly addresses the Copy-
right Act's work for hire provisions." Brief for Respondent, supra note 28, at 10. An ami-
cus brief submitted by the United States Copyright Office and the Solicitor General sup-
ported the Respondent's view: "The language, history, and purpose of the work-made-for-
hire provisions make clear that Subsection (1) applies only to works prepared by regular,
salaried employees .... " Brief for Register of Copyrights as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 7, CCNV v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989) (No. 88-293) [hereinafter Brief
for Register]. The Copyright Office is the agency which has the responsibility of adminis-
tering and regulating the Copyright Laws. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 701-710 (1982). Reid's attor-
ney noted that the most significant development in the case was the Solicitor General's
brief on behalf of Reid and his formal, salaried interpretation because the Supreme Court
often follows the Solicitor General's viewpoint in difficult cases involving federal law. See
L.A. Times, Feb. 12, 1989, Calendar Section, at 7.
CCNV v. Reid
legislative history,6' the Court quickly rejected this interpretation
on two grounds.62 First, the Court noted that the express lan-
guage of section 101(1) does not support such an interpretation. 63
The Court reasoned that "[t]he Act does not say 'formal' or 'sala-
ried' employee, but simply 'employee.'""' Second, the Court
noted that the respondent, amici and the Ninth Circuit who sup-
port the "formal, salaried" approach disagree on the test's con-
tent."3 Finally, the Court asserted that the Dumas court actually
adopted an approach drawn from agency law principles which the
Court endorses.66 Perhaps more persuasive arguments militate
61 See CCNV v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2174 n.8 (1989) ("there is some support for such
a [formal, salaried] definition in the legislative history"). Borge Varmer's study of works
made for hire and on commission was part of Congress' program of research of the copy-
right law which would aid in the revision process of the 1909 Act. See STAFF OF SUBCOMMIT-
TEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, 86TH CONG. 2d SESS., STUDY
13 WORKS MADE FOR HIRE AND ON COMMISSION (Comm. Print 1960) (report by B. Varmer).
Varmer concluded that the 1909 Act's work for hire provisions only addressed salaried
employees and suggested that if the work for hire rule was not to include commissioned
works, the definition might further specify "employment on a salary basis." Id. at 141. In
1963, a preliminary draft of the work made for hire definition read: "a work prepared by
an employee within the scope of his duties of his employment, but not including a work made
on special order or commission." REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, 89TH CONG., 1st SESS., SUPPLEMEN-
TARY REPORT ON COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION PART 6, at 66 (Comm. Print 1965) (emphasis
added). The publisher's substantial resistance to this definition lead to subsection (2) of the
existing act, enumerating specific instances where commissioned works are works made for
hire. See supra notes 8-20 and accompanying text. Important for present purposes is that
virtually all the parties resisting the preliminary draft referred to employees as formal,
salaried employees. See, e.g., COPYRIGHT LAW REVISION, PART 4, FURTHER DIscuSSIONS AND
COMMENTS ON PRELIMINARY DRAFT FOR REVISED U.S. COPYRIGHT LAW, 88TH CONG., 2d SESS.
250 (Comm. Print 1964) (American Book Publishers complained that suggested definition
would "include only work done by a salaried employee in the scope of his regular duties");
Id. PART 3, at 259-61 (American Bar Association representative argued against preliminary
definition because there was no difference between "payroll" worker and commissioned
worker) (emphasis added); Id. at 267 (" 'employee' . .. means social security, withholdings,
and all other attendant mechanical housekeeping tasks"); Id. at 321 ("might be helpful not
to restrict [definition] to .. .technical employer-employee relationship"); Hardy, Copyright
Law's Concept of Employment-What Congress Really Intended, 35 J. COPYRIGHT SOc'Y OF USA,
210, 225-27 (1988) (provides numerous examples similar to those mentioned above). See
also Note, supra note 11, at 901 ("plenty of discussion indicates that everyone involved
understood [employee] to mean someone working for an employer in a salaried job ...").
6" See infra notes 74-92 and accompanying text (analyzes Court's two bases for rejecting
formal, salaried interpretation).
65 CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2174 n.8.
4Id.
65 See id. The Court suggests that Respondent's test required the hired party to be on
the payroll while an amicus' test required that the hired party "receives a salary and is
treated as an employee for Social Security and tax purposes ..... Id.
" See id. "Even the one court of appeals to adopt what it termed a formal, salaried em-
ployee test in fact embraced an approach incorporating numerous factors drawn from the
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against the rationale of the CCNV Court.
A. Rules of Statutory Interpretation Favor the Ordinary and Common
Understanding of the Term "Employee"
While it is true that section 101(1) does not explicitly say "for-
mal" or "salaried, ' 6 7 it is suggested that the CCNV Court's reli-
ance on this premise to reject the Dumas view defeats its own
agency law construction of the term "employee." If express lan-
guage is the Court's criterion," then "employee" cannot carry its
agency law meaning either because the statute does not say "em-
ployee according to agency law principles."'69 In the absence of a
statutory definition, the general rule of statutory construction is
that "words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contem-
porary, common meaning. ' ' 70 Although the established legal un-
derstanding of the term employee falls within the agency interpre-
tation, 71  the "ordinary" and "common" meaning favors a
"formal, salaried" construction. 72
B. Consensus on the Application of Dumas
The CCNV Court also based its refusal to adopt a "formal, sala-
ried" interpretation on the inability of the proponents of this view
agency law definition of employee which we endorse." Id. (citation omitted).
" See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1982); supra note 8 (quotes text of § 101(1)).
68 See CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2174 n.8 (language of act cannot support "formal, salaried"
approach); Reply Brief for Petitioner at 12, CCNV v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989) (No. 88-
293) [hereinafter Reply Brief] ("would not have been difficult for Congress to place adjec-
tives 'formal' and 'salaried' before the word 'employee' in Section 101(1)").
"9 See 17 U.S.C. § 101(1) (1982). But see CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2172-73 (Court argues that
"scope of employment" is widely used term of art in agency law).
0 Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979). See Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569,
571 (1966) (words of statutes should be construed in ordinary, everyday sense); Deputy v.
DuPont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940) ("general rule is that popular . . . import of words
furnishes the interpretation of public laws").
"' See, e.g., Kelley v. Southern Pac., 419 U.S. 318, 322-23 (1974) (standard of proof of
employment for coverage under FELA is proof of master-servant relationship); Baker v.
Texas & Pac. Ry., 359 U.S. 227, 228 (1959) (same); Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry.,
237 U.S. 84, 94 (1915) (same).
"2 See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DIc-rIONARY 459 (2d ed. 1972) ("person hired by another,
or by a business firm, etc., to work for wages or salary"); Brief for Respondent, supra note
28, at 24 ("hired by another at a regularly paid salary to work over a long, indefinite time
period"... "what most people understand 'employee' to mean"). See also Litman, supra
note 11, at 890 (pre-legislative dialogue indicated phrase to mean "a salaried worker in a
long-term position").
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to agree on its application." An examination of the tests pro-
posed, however, reveals that they all contain the same intrinsic el-
ement: a hired party who receives compensation on a regular ba-
sis. 4  The Court illustrated the tests to demonstrate the
inconsistencies.7 6 For example, it noted that Reid urged a test
where the hired party must be a payroll employee,° while the
amicus brief of Volunteer Lawyers for the Arts proposed that the
hired party must be treated as an employee for tax and Social Se-
curity purposes." It is submitted that the distinctions between the
tests are trivial and in no way precluded the Court from adopting
a "formal, salaried" approach.
Finally, the CCNV Court suggested that the Dumas court in fact
adopted an agency law approach which the Supreme Court en-
dorsed .7  The Dumas approach, however, is distinguishable.7 9 It
incorporates specific agency law factors into its test only in the
rare circumstances when the relationship between the parties is
ambiguous.8 0 In addition, when incorporated, these factors do not
include the "control or right to control" factor adopted by the
73 See supra note 65. See also Reply Brief, supra note 68, at 7-9 (distinguishes tests pro-
posed by various proponents of formal, salaried approach).
"' See, e.g., Brief for Respondent, supra note 28, at 37 (hired party on payroll); Brief for
Register, supra note 60, at 13 (salaried worker in long term position); Brief for Volunteer
Lawyers for the Arts Inc. et al as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 4, CCNV v.
Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989) (No. 88-293) [hereinafter Brief for VLA] (receives salary and
treated like employee for tax and social security purposes). Analysis of the briefs men-
tioned by the Court, in fact, propose a general Dumas "formal, salaried" approach, rather
than a particular test as the Court suggests. See Brief for Respondent, supra note 28, at 38
("Respondent Reid believes that the best definition of a work for hire employee is the
'formal, salaried' employee as recently enunciated by the Dumas court .... ") (emphasis added);
Brief for Register, supra note 60, at 7 ("We agree with the Ninth Circuit"); Brief for VLA,
supra, at 2 (VLA submits that Dumas was correct).
'5 See supra note 65.
76 See CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2174 n.8 ("hired party who is on payroll is an employee within
§ 101(1)").
71 See id. ("hired party who receives a salary and is treated as an employee for social
security and tax purposes is an employee within §101(1)") (emphasis in original).
78 See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
79 See infra notes 80 and 81 and accompanying text (discussing how Dumas is distinguish-
able from the agency law approach adopted by the Court).
10 See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d. 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989) (when "relationship
is ambiguous" apply relevant factors). It is important to note that when utilizing the for-
mal, salaried test "few disputes should arise as to the status of the artist." Id. See also Brief
for Respondent, supra note 28, at 24 n.17 ("[for those very limited situations where this
definition does not resolve all questions, an agency-type analysis would still be available")
(emphasis added).
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Supreme Court.81 The Dumas court reasoned that by indirectly
"includ[ing] the rejected 'supervision and control' test," the Easter
Seal agency test could cause some independent contractors to be
deemed employees.8 " While Dumas' "bright-line" method does
create some degree of uncertainty in situations where the agency
factors are used, it is suggested that these ambiguities are minimal
when compared with the Easter Seal test adopted by the Supreme
Court.
III. THE Easter Seal TEST: AMBIGUITIES ADOPTED
BY THE CCNV Court
A. The Nonexclusive Multifactor Test
The Supreme Court's interpretation Qf the work made for hire
provisions affects thousands of business relationships because ap-
proximately forty percent of all copyright registrations are works
for hire." Therefore, the need for certainty in the interpretation
is essential.84 In CCNV v. Reid, the Supreme Court promulgated a
11 See Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105 (degree of control not relevant in determining employ-
ment status of artist). See also infra note 82 and accompanying text (discusses rationale be-
hind Dumas' exclusion of "control" factor).
" See id. at 1104. The Dumas court noted that if the Easter Seal agency test was applied
in situations where the hiring party includes provisions in the contract granting itself sub-
stantial rights of control, "independent contractors could be deemed 'employees.' " Id.
Surprisingly, the CCNV Court based their rejection of the "right to control" and "actual
control" tests on the same reasoning. See CCNV v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166, 2173-74 (1989);
supra note 52, Nevertheless, the Supreme Court chose to adopt the control factor of
agency law as relevant to determining whether a hired party is an employee. See id. at
2178.
" See CCNV, 109 S.Ct. at 2171 n.4 ("[als of 1955, approximately 40 percent of all copy-
right registrations were for works for hire") (citing STUDIES PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON
PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH
CONG., 2d Sass. STUDY 13 at 139 n.49 Works Made for Hire and on Commission (report by
B. Varmer) (Comm. Print, 1960)); L.A. Daily Journal, June 28, 1989, at 7, col. 1 ("may
affect . . . 40 percent of all copyrighted work") (quoting R. Weisgrau, Director of Ameri-
can Society of Magazine Photographers). Cf. L.A. Times, February 12, 1989, at 7 (esti-
mated potential dollars at stake run as high as $43 billion). The Supreme Court recognized
the significance of its interpretation: "The contours of the work for hire doctrine ... carry
profound significance for freelance creators . . . and for the publish[ers]." CCNV, 109 S.
Ct. at 2171.
" See id. at 2177 (paramount goal of Congress in revising 1976 Act was to enhance
predictability and certainty); Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1104 (9th Cir. 1989)
("drafters wanted a bright line between employees and independent contractors, so that
the parties would not be mistaken in their appraisal of the contracted work's status"); Corn-
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nonexclusive multifactor agency balancing test where no one fac-
tor is determinative.85 This test creates unnecessary ambiguity8
which will increase the already overwhelming caseload of the
courts.87 "Practical considerations point to a definition of copy-
right 'employees' as regular, salaried employees."88 The use of a
straightforward "formal, salaried" definition of employee rather
than a multifactor balancing test would have established the cer-
tainty and stability necessary in the copyright marketplace.89 In
accord with this position, Senator Thad Cochran of Mississippi
contends that "the Reid decision invite[s] legislative clarifica-
ment, Copyright, Independent Contractors, and the Work-for-Hire Doctrine: Community for Cre-
ative Non-Violence v. Reid, 67 N.C.L. REV. 994, 996 (1989) (because of tremendous effect
doctrine has on business transactions, "need for clarification is acute").
" See CCNV, 109 S. Ct. at 2178-79; supra note 51 and 55 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY and multifactor agency test).
" See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 120 (1943) (suggesting there is no
"simple, uniform and easily applicable" common law test to distinguish between employees
and independent contractors); Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1104 n.18 (9th Cir.
1989) (agency test does not provide "good fit" in copyright context); 135 CONG. REC. S1253
(daily ed. June 22, 1989) (statement of Sen. Thad Cochran) [hereinafter CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD - Cochran] (CCNV decision did not "articulate a definitive interpretation of 'em-
ployee' "); Comment, supra note 84, at 1007 (suggesting agency test does not create cer-
tainty and stability necessary in copyright marketplace). But cf Brief for Petitioner at 10,
CCNV v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989) (No. 88-293) (formal, salaried view does not provide
greater certainty).
" See generally Reynolds & Richman, The Non-Precedential Precedent - Limited Publication
and No-Citation Rules in the United States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167, 1167
(1978) ("federal courts.., have been beset by a staggering increase in workload" in recent
years); Id. at 1168 ("caseload of courts ... is becoming unmanageable"). Immediately after
the CCNV decision was handed down on June 5, 1989, it became apparent that the decision
would increase the amount of disputes arising under the work for hire provisions. See CON-
GRESSIONAL RECORD - Cochran, supra note 84 ("inevitable uncertainties and costs associated
with agency law test") (emphasis added); Wash. Post, June 6, 1989, § B, at 8, col. 2 (deci-
sion does not resolve work for hire debate); Legal Times,June 12, 1989, at 19 ("absence of
an objective standard may prevent the predictability essential to avoid frequent recourse to
litigation"); N.Y. Times, June 12, 1989, at D 13, col. 3 ("potential for enormous disruption
in what was thought to be a settled relationship"); L.A. Daily Journal, June 28, 1989, at 7,
col. 4 ("ruling not expected to . . . reduce . . . litigation in . . . copyright" area).
8 Supra Comment, note 84, at 1007. See CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Cochran, supra note
86 (" 'formal, salaried' language would provide clear guidance to the courts and to parties
involved in the creation and dissemination of copyrightable works").
as See Dumas, 865 F.2d at 1105 (using formal, salaried interpretation "few disputes
should arise as to status of artist"); Hardy, Copyright Law's Concept of Employment - What
Congress Really Intended, 35 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 210, 258 (1988) ("[a] far more satisfactory
test of employment is that of regular, formal employment"); Brief for Respondent, supra
note 28, at 24 (advantage of formal, salaried construction is that it provides "predictability
and certainty as to copyright ownership"); supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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tion."'' Immediately after the decision was handed down, Senator
Cochran proposed a legislative amendment to section 101(1) of
the 1976 Act which would prefix the term "employee" with "for-
mal salaried."91 It is submitted that the complex application of the
multifactor balancing test could lead to another split in the cir-
cuits with regard to the relative importance of specific factors.
B. Problems Arising Out of the Court's Failure to Address the Issue of
Retroactivity
In Chevron Oil v. Huson,92 the Supreme Court provided three
separate factors to determine whether a judicial decision is non-
retroactive:9" 1) whether the decision establishes a new principle
of law,94 2) whether the retrospective operation will further or re-
tard the operation of the rule,9 5 and 3) whether retrospective op-
eration will lead to inequitable results.96 Nevertheless, in CCNV v.
Reid, the Supreme Court further distorted the application of its
" CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - Cochran, supra note 86. Cf supra note 47 (legislature's fail-
ure to define "employee" is origin of present dispute).
' S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). Senator Cochran's Bill reads in pertinent part:
That section 101 of title 17, United States Code, is amended -
(1) by amending clause (1) . . . of the definition, "work made for hire" to read as
follows:
(1) a work, other than a specially ordered or commissioned work, prepared by a for-
mal salaried employee within the scope of his or her employment; ....
Id. (emphasis added). In the past, Senator Cochran has prepared numerous bills to amend
the work for hire provisions of the Copyright Law. See S. 1223, 100th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); S. 2138, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); S. 2044, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
" 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
OS See id. at 106-07; infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text (discussing three factors).
But cf Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1940) (" [I]t
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all inclusive statement of a principle of abso-
lute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.").
' See Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106 (1971). The new principle can be established by
overruling clear precedent. See Hanover Shoe v. United States Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481,
496 (1968) (no reason to refrain from applying decision retroactively unless party relied on
clearly established judicial doctrine which was overruled). The new principle can also be
established by deciding an issue of first impression. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393
U.S. 544, 572 (1969) (decision given prospective effect because involved "complex issues of
first impression").
9' See Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07 (1971). The Court stated that "we must... weigh
the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question,
its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its opera-
tion." Id. (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965)).
" See Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 107 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701,
706 (1969).
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interpretation by failing to address the issue of retroactivity.9"
Since the effective date of the 1976 Copyright Act is January 1,
1978, 98 many freelance creators will now attempt to reclaim the
copyrights to works produced over the last eleven years.99 It is
suggested that a determination of nonretroactivity would have
precluded a potential explosion of litigation between artists assert-
ing their rights and media companies protecting their chief assets.
It is further suggested that such a determination would have insu-
lated media companies from the inequitable economic hardships
resulting from the possible redistribution of their copyrights.'
CONCLUSION
In CCNV v. Reid, the Supreme Court unnecessarily complicated
the work made for hire provisions of the Copyright Act of 1976.
In an effort to resolve the conflict of interpretation among the
circuits, the Court has created ambiguities which will foster addi-
tional disputes. This Comment has asserted that a better approach
would have been a nonretroactive, formal, salaried interpretation
of "employee." As an alternative to the Court's ruling, the simple
See CCNV v. Reid, 109 S. Ct. 2166 (1989) (opinion does not address issue whether
retroactive to effective date of Copyright Act of 1976).
8 See 17 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1977) (historical note on first page of Title 17 identifies
effective date as January 1, 1978).
" See Legal Times, June 12, 1989, 19 (freelance creators presumed to be employees in
past will now seek to reclaim ownership and profits of their copyrightable works, as well as
adaptations and derivative works) (citing Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 97 (1971). Paul Gold-
stein, a professor of copyright law at Stanford University Law School noted that the ruling
of the court will probably apply to material published since January 1, 1978. See N.Y.
Times, June 12, 1989, at D13, col. 3.
'" See Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U.S. 60, 71-72 (1881) (overruling judicial construction of
statute will not be given retroactive effect). Cf supra note 96 (discussing equitable consider-
ations involved in deciding whether decision has retroactive effect). Since copyrights to the
material that they distribute are the chief assets of most media companies, a retroactive
application of a decision which reassesses the ownership of those assets would have a disas-
trous effect on the economic well-being of the companies. See N.Y. Times, June 12, 1989,
at D13, col. 3 ("chief asset of many media companies" is copyrights). Cf. Cipriano v. City of
Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706 (1969) ("[w]here a decision of this Court could produce sub-
stantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis ... for avoiding the
'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity") (quoting Great N. Ry. v. Sunburst
Oil & Ref. Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 (1932)); Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State
Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 374 (1939) ("Questions of rights claimed to have become vested . ..
of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public pol-
icy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination.").
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solution is a statutory amendment codifying the formal, salaried
definition of "employee." A prospective application of this ap-
proach would establish the certainty necessary to satisfy the expec-
tations of both parties engaged in work for hire relationships.
Douglas W. Hammond
